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JURISDICTION
This case involves a contract dispute involving the payment of royalties
from the production of oil in the Uintah Basin. Appellant Christopher M. Sullivan
("Sullivan") appealed the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining's ("Board") Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order issued on April 25, 2007. This Court has
jurisdiction to decide the appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iv).
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Sullivan's appeal raises the following issues, none of which warrant reversal
and remand:
(a)

Does UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9 impose a non-discretionary duty on

the Board to order that the disputed monies be deposited into an escrow account?
(b)

Does UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9 mandate that the Board conduct a

formal adjudicatory hearing on the merits?
(c)
CODE ANN.

Has Sullivan demonstrated substantial prejudice, as required by UTAH
§ 63-46b-16(4), arising from the Board's refusal to order the disputed

funds into escrow?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court shall grant relief "only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced"
for any of the reasons set forth in the Administrative Code Procedures Act, UTAH

CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4). SeeAdkins v. Board of Oil, Gas, Mining, 926 P.2d
880, 882 (Utah 1996). '"A party has been substantially prejudiced if 'the alleged
error was not harmless.'" WWC Holding Co,, Inc, v. Public Service Comm yn, 2002
UT 23, \ 7, 44 P.3d 714 (2001) (internal citation omitted).
The abuse of discretion standard of review applies in this case. WWC
Holding Co,, 2002 UT 23, \ 8; accord Brown & Root Indus, Comm 'n of Utah, 947
P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). Under this standard, the Board's holdings will not be
disturbed "unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality." Brown, 947 P.2d at 677. Absent "a grant of discretion, legal issues
are reviewed under a correction-of-error standard." WWC Holding Co,, 2002 UT
23,1 8.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
To decide this case, the Court must construe and apply UTAH CODE ANN. §
40-6-9. This statute is attached hereto in its entirely as an addendum. The statute
requires that the operator of oil and gas projects deposit payments into escrow "if
accrued payments cannot be made within the time limits specified," and allows
"any person legally entitled to the payment of the proceeds" from oil and gas
production to petition the Board to request an "investigation and negotiation" to
determine whether "reasonable justification" for the non-payment exists. The
statute also allows the Board to hold an evidentiary hearing on the same.
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STATEMENT OF CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Sullivan's Interest Under the Assignment Sullivan and Robert

Weaver, through B&A Properties, LLC ("B&A"),1 are the successors in interest to
the rights reserved under an "Assignment Affecting Record Title to Oil and Gas
Lease" from Joseph Thomas to Raymond Chorney ("Assignment"). R44, 70. This
dispute centers on the interpretation of the following language in the Assignment:
"Three Percent (3%) of 8/8, see attached rider." R74-76; R100. The Rider reads
in pertinent part:
Assignor hereby excepts and reserves an obligation equal to $300.00
per acre for the number of acres assigned hereby, the same to be
paid out of 3% of the market value at the wells, as produced, of all
the oil and gas which may be produced, saved and marketed from the
above described lands under the terms of said lease or any extensions
and renewals thereof.
R76 (emphasis added).
2.

Notice of Overpayment On February 1, 2006, KMG notified

Sullivan that "[KMG], its predecessors in interest, and other lessees have
mistakenly made payments to you in excess of the obligation created by the
Production Payment in the Parent Lease." R45. By letter dated March 7, 2006,
counsel representing both Sullivan and B&A responded that they interpreted the
Assignment to include both a 3% production payment and a 3% overriding royalty,
for a combined 6% interest; they thereby requested additional funds. R49-52.
1

B&A declined to participate in the proceeding below.
3

Even though KMG viewed the reserved interest as satisfied, KMG made monthly
deposits to a suspense account. R104; R185 at 20.
3.

Request for Agency Action On July 31, 2006, Sullivan filed a

Request for Agency Action ("Request") before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining
("Board") to determine his interest under the Assignment. R3-7.
4.

On September 11,2006, KMG filed its Response to Request for

Agency Action ("Response"). In its Response, KMG requested that the Board
summarily deny Sullivan's Request because KMG had already explained "why the
proceeds have not been paid," and provided "reasonable justification" regarding
the same. KMG explained that unlike Sullivan, KMG construed the Assignment as
reserving a 3% production payment (which already had been satisfied), rather than
two separate 3% interests. R65-91.
5.

Parallel Judicial Proceeding On September 14, 2006, KMG filed an

action in district court against both Sullivan and B&A seeking a declaratory
judgment regarding its contract interpretation, and to specifically recover the
amounts it overpaid to Sullivan and B&A. R108. Counterclaims were filed by
Sullivan and B&A.
6.

Referral to Division On December 6, 2006, as stipulated to by both

parties and required by statute, the Board ordered the Division of Oil, Gas and
Mining ("Division") to commence a 60-day investigation and negotiation. R98;
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R183 at 5-8. On December 20, 2006, the Division informed the parties of the
investigation and negotiation, and requested that each party provide relevant
information. R98.
7.

Negotiation Before the Division On January 31, 2007, after

collecting information from the parties, the Division conducted the negotiation
which did not successfully resolve the dispute. R99-109. During the negotiation,
each party presented its case and contract interpretation, the Division asked
clarifying questions to which each party responded, and then the parties broke up
into different rooms for discussion and possible resolution. R185 at 6.
8.

Division's Report Following the negotiation, the Division issued its

Memorandum Regarding Investigation and Negotiations, dated February 13, 2007
("Division's Report"). The Division's Report sets forth the nature of the dispute,
restates the statutory authority vested with the Division and Board, summarizes the
facts and the parties' positions, and then provides its conclusions. R99-108. Of
particular interest is that the Division acknowledged the parties were in agreement
that the dispute concerned the interpretation of the language in the Assignment.
RlOl. The Division also explained that the statute does not provide for the Board
to determine if Sullivan "is legally entitled to payment" but rather, whether nonpayment was with reasonable justification. RlOl. The Division further concluded
that the:
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investigation did not find any information that, if offered
and proved in a hearing before the Board, would show
that Kerr McGee suspended payments to Sullivan
without a good faith judgment that the payments were not
owed. Without such facts being alleged there is no basis
for a hearing on any issue the Board is authorized to
decide. In short,... nothing has been offered to show
that Kerr McGee has acted unreasonably.
R108. The Division then concluded that the "investigation of this matter did not
discover facts that provide a proper basis for Board action if a hearing were held."
R108.
9.

Sullivan's Response to Division's Report On February 23, 2007,

Sullivan submitted an unsolicited Response to Division's Report wherein he
expressed dissatisfaction with the investigation, and asked for a continuance to
allow him to collect additional information to allow a more "meaningful
investigation" and time to review documents. Rl 10-115.
10.

Board's Hearing On March 28, 2007, the Board held a hearing.

R185. At the hearing, James Allen, assistant attorney general representing the
Division, reported on the investigation and negotiation, provided the Division's
Report, and then recommended that the matter not be set for hearing by the Board.
R185 at 4. Mr. Allen also reviewed the Board's statutory authority, explaining that
the Board could conduct a hearing to determine if reasonable justification existed
for non-payment. R185 at 4. Mr. Allen reported, however, that the parties
concurred that "the reason the proceeds are unpaid is because they disagree as to
6

whether they are, in fact, owed to Sullivan." R185 at 9. He then explained that the
hearing before the Board was "discretionary, not mandatory," and if no hearing
was held, the parties could still seek a remedy in the pending state court
proceeding. R185 at 8.
11.

Sullivan's counsel, Chris Jones, then addressed the Board, specifically

concurring that a hearing was not necessary because, as Mr. Jones stated, "this is a
matter best decided before a court." R185 at 11. Nevertheless, counsel for
Sullivan requested that the Board order KMG to deposit the disputed funds in an
escrow account. R185 at 11. This was the only action Sullivan requested of the
Board. R185atl9.
12.

After the Board heard from each party and the Division, by

unanimous decision, the Board agreed that no hearing was necessary. R185 at 29.
13.

Board's Order Challenged Here On April 25, 2007, the Board

issued an order entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order ("Board
Order"). R117-122. The Board's factual findings are limited to four paragraphs,
noting that: (1) notice was properly given to the parties; (2) the parties had time to
submit information to support their respective positions; (3) the investigation failed
to resolve the dispute and the basis for the Division's recommendation; and (4)
Sullivan concurred that the "underlying dispute should be decided in State court."
R118-119. The Board also explained that it had discretion either to "(1) set a
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hearing, or (2) decline to set a hearing and allow the petitioner to seek a remedy in
a court of competent jurisdiction instead." R119. The Board then held that it
would not set a hearing and invited the parties to resolve the dispute in the pending
state court action. R120.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Sullivan misconstrues the language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9 and how it
applies. Under the plain language of the statute, the Board acted within its
discretion and authority in denying a hearing on the merits and in not ordering the
deposit of monies into an escrow account. First, the statute provides relief only to
those persons who are "legally entitled" to payment, not to persons who have a
dispute over entitlement to payment. Second, Sullivan waived any right to exhaust
all administrative remedies and, therefore, is barred from seeking judicial review of
the Board's decision. In any event, nothing in the statute mandates that the Board
hold a hearing. Third, the Board lacked authority to order the deposit of funds into
escrow even if the Board had held a full evidentiary hearing and Sullivan
prevailed.
In addition, Sullivan fails to demonstrate substantial prejudice because he
can recover interest in the district court matter if he prevails. Finally, Sullivan's
assertion that the Board failed to order a continuance of the administrative matter
pending resolution of the case pending in district court lacks merit because
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Sullivan failed to request such relief to the Board and nothing in the statute
requires such a remedy.
ARGUMENT
I.

SULLIVAN'S INTERPRETATION OF THE GOVERNING
STATUTE LACKS MERIT
Sullivan contends that UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9 required the Board to

conduct an evidentiary hearing and order deposit of monies into escrow. Sullivan
Br. at 16 (arguing that payment into escrow is not conditioned on a showing of
lack of reasonable justification). As demonstrated below, Sullivan misconstrues
the purpose and application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9, and, the Board properly
interpreted and applied its authority.
A.

THE STATUTE APPLIES IN NARROW CIRCUMSTANCES

The statute applies to "any person legally entitled to payment[,]" and not to
disputes over whether a person is legally entitled to payment, as Sullivan contends.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 40-6-9(1 )(a) (emphasis added). Operators, like KMG, are

obligated to make deposits to escrow only "[i]f accrued payments cannot be made
with the time limits" specified by the statute. Id. § 40-6-9(3)(b)(i) (emphasis
added). For example, a company may not know where to make payment. The
statute allows any person "entitled to oil and gas proceeds" to request that the
Board conduct an "investigation and negotiation" and, if the negotiation does not
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resolve the matter, to "conduct a hearing to determine why the proceeds have not
been paid." Id. § 40-6-9(4)-(6).
Based on the above language, relief under the statute presupposes that a
person is "legally entitled to payment." Sullivan did not need an investigation or
hearing to know why he was not paid. Sullivan knew that a dispute existed on the
threshold question of whether he was legally entitled to payment. Rather than
requesting that the Board investigate whether "reasonable justification" existed for
the lack of payment, he should have filed his breach of contract claims in state
court. Because he did not do so, KMG filed the pending parallel state court action.
B.

THE BOARD REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO DECLINE
TO HOLD A HEARING

Sullivan's repeated assertion that the Board improperly denied him a formal
"evidentiary hearing," see Sullivan Br. at 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 21, 23, 33-31, should be
rejected for two reasons.
First, Sullivan waived any right he had to a formal or informal hearing, and
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies thereby barring any right to judicial
review. During the March 28, 2007 hearing, Sullivan, through his counsel,
withdrew his request for a hearing and specifically conceded "that this is a matter
best decided before a court." R185 at 11. The Board noted in its Order that
Sullivan "conceded at the hearing that the underlying dispute should be decided in
State court." R119. Because Sullivan waived any alleged right to a hearing before
10

the Board and to exhaust all administrative remedies, he has lost any right to
judicial review before this Court. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-14(2) ("A party
may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies
available....") (emphasis added).
Second, nothing in the statute required the Board to conduct a formal
evidentiary hearing. The statute provides that upon receipt of the petition for
review, the Board "shall set the matter for investigation and negotiation by the
division within 60 days." UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9(5). In the event the Division
cannot resolve the matter by investigation and negotiation, the statue provides that
the Board "may set a hearing within 30 days." Id. § 40-6-9(6)(a) (emphasis
added). If the Board does not set a hearing, "any information gathered during the
investigation and negotiation shall be given to the petitioner who may then seek a
remedy in a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. § 40-6-9(6)(b).
As evidenced by the plain language, nothing in the statute imposes a
mandatory duty on the Board to hold a formal evidentiary hearing. Review of this
plain language, using the basic statutory construction principles, evidences that the

KMG notes that the Order provided notice to Sullivan of a right of appeal to this
Court. R120-21. KMG believes that the Board simply provided the standard
language regarding appeal rights in the event Sullivan believed he had the right to
an appeal. Nothing in the Order constituted (nor could it constitute) an admission
that a right of jurisdiction existed in the face of a clear waiver of Sullivan's right to
exhaust all administrative remedies.
11

Board properly interpreted and then applied its authority. See, e.g., Nelson v. Salt
Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) ("A statute is generally construed
according to its plain language"); Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370
(Utah 1994) ("the interpretation must be based on the language used" and there is
no power to "infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there").
The Board reasonably exercised its discretion to decline to hold a formal
evidentiary hearing because Sullivan waived any right to a hearing.
C.

THE BOARD REASONABLY DECLINED TO ORDER THE DEPOSIT OF
FUNDS INTO ESCROW

Sullivan's claim that the disputed funds must be deposited into escrow lacks
merit based on the statutory scheme and language. If the Board sets a hearing, the
purpose is to determine (1) if the proceeds have been deposited in an interest
bearing account, and (2) if "the delay of payment is without reasonable
justification"

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 40-6-9(7) (emphasis added). If, after a hearing,

there has been no escrow of disputed funds, the Board "may" order an accounting
and interest at 1-1/2% as a "substitute for an escrow account interest rate." Id. §
40-6-9(7)(a). In addition, if, after a hearing, the Board finds that no "reasonable
justification" exists and payments have not been escrowed, the Board can order an
accounting, and/or payment of the appropriately suspended funds along with
assessing interest. Id. § 40-6-9(7)(b). If, on the other hand, the Board finds
"reasonable justification" exists for non-payment and payments have been
12

escrowed, no accounting or payment to the person is required until "the condition
which justified suspension" is satisfied. Id. § 40-6-9(7)(d).

Accordingly,

nothing in the governing statutory language requires payment into escrow if
"reasonable justification" exists for the non-payment.
In this case, the Board properly applied the statute. After the Division's
investigation and negotiation, the Board scheduled a hearing to allow the parties to
comment on whether the matter should be set for hearing. R185. The Division
explained that the "investigation did not find any information that, if offered and
proved in a hearing before the Board, would show that Kerr McGee suspended
payments to Sullivan without a good faith judgment that the payments were not
owed. Without such facts being alleged there is no basis for a hearing on any issue
the Board is authorized to decide. In short,... nothing has been offered to show
that Kerr McGee has acted unreasonably." R108.
It was entirely reasonable for the Board to decline to order the deposit of
monies into escrow given that Sullivan chose not to dispute the Division's finding
that reasonable justification for withholding funds existed. More importantly,
nothing in the statute allowed the Board to order the deposit of monies into escrow.
Even if an evidentiary hearing had occurred, the most the Board could do is order
payment to Sullivan with interest and penalties.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 40-6-

9(7)(b)(ii) ("If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is without
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reasonable justification, the board may: if the proceeds have not been deposited in
an interest bearing escrow account..., assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total
proceeds and interest as determined....").
II.

SULLIVAN'S ALLEGED HARM LACKS MERIT
As to harm, Sullivan contends that he lost the benefit of interest on the

monies that allegedly should have been placed in escrow. Sullivan Br. at 16.
However, Sullivan cannot claim harm because he can recover interest if he prevails
in the state court action. Both prejudgment and post judgment interest can be
assessed through the state court action in favor of the prevailing party. See
CODE ANN.

UTAH

§§ 15-1-1, 15-1-4. Because Sullivan cannot demonstrate that he has

been substantially prejudiced, he is not entitled to relief in this Court.

UTAH CODE

ANN. § 63-46b-16(4) (no grant of relief allowed unless the aggrieved person "has
been substantially prejudiced").
III.

THE STATUTE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A CONTINUANCE
PENDING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Sullivan's argument that the Board should have continued "this matter

pending a judicial adjudication to obtain an interpretation of the subject
Assignment...." is devoid of any legal support. Sullivan Br. at 28. First, the statute

3

Moreover, Sullivan cannot demonstrate prejudice that he would not be able to
recover penalties because penalties can be assessed only "after a hearing," see
UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9(7)(b)(ii), and Sullivan waived any right to a hearing.
14

itself does not provide for this course of action. Second, Sullivan never requested
this relief from the Board and cannot do so now in this appeal.
Specifically, the statute provides for two options: either the Board can set a
hearing or where the Board does not set a hearing, the petitioner is free to file an
action in district court. UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-9(6)(a) & (b). Nowhere does the
statute provide for a "continuance" of the administrative proceeding to allow a
parallel judicial proceeding. Furthermore, while the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act provides a process whereby Sullivan could petition the Board for a
stay in the appropriate circumstances (which do not exist here), he failed to avail
himself of that option. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63 -46b-18. Therefore, Sullivan's
position is contrary to the authority granted to the Board.
Finally, even assuming the Board could continue the matter pending judicial
intervention, Sullivan did not make that request to the Board.4 Instead, as clearly
set forth in the hearing minutes, Sullivan's only request was to place the disputed
funds in escrow and nothing more. R186 at 21. Because this position was not
advanced before the Board, it cannot be considered on appeal. See, e.g., Whitear v.

4

Sullivan submitted an unsolicited "Response to the DOGM Memorandum" and
simply requested a continuance to allow him to obtain additional information and
for the Division to conduct what he considered to be a "meaningful" investigation.
R113. He did not request a continuance venting judicial review of this matter.
15

Labor Comm 7i, 973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an issue not
raised before administrative agency will not be considered on appeal).
IV.

KMG DOES NOT OBJECT TO SUBMITTING TO THE BOARD'S
JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE PENDING DISPUTE
As explained above, the statute's application is limited to persons "legally

entitled to payment[,]" and not to disputes over whether a person is legally entitled
to payment as Sullivan contends.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 40-6-9(1 )(a). To apply, the

statute presupposes that one is legally entitled to payment. As recognized by the
Division, the statute allows for an investigation and hearing into whether lack of
payment is without "reasonable justification," but does not allow for a
determination of market title or the legal entitlement to proceeds. R103. Such a
determination is outside the expertise of the Board and is therefore better left for
the court. R103.
It is undisputed by both parties that this dispute centers on legal entitlement
to oil and gas proceeds; specifically, the dispute centers on the interpretation of the
reserved interest under the Assignment. R100. However, if this Court believes
that the Board has jurisdiction to decide this issue, KMG agrees to submit to a
formal adjudicative proceeding on the underlying dispute if the pending district
court matter is stayed, and to deposit the disputed monies into escrow pending
resolution of the administrative appeal process.

16

CONCLUSION
the reasons set forth above, KMG respectfully requests that this Court
disregard Sullivan's erroneous interpretation ;iud application of the statute and
deny his request for relief.
DATED this 6th day of December, 2007.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

Craig D. Galli
Cecilia M. Romero
Attorneys for Respondent, Kerr-McGee
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ADDENDUM

Page 1

l o f 1 DOCUMENT
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION AND THE NOVEMBER 2007
ELECTION. ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 72 (11/27/2007); 2007 UT APP 301 (11/27/2007) AND
SEPTEMBER 1, 2007 (FEDERAL CASES). ***
TITLE 40. MINES AND MINING
CHAPTER 6. BOARD AND DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 (2007)
§ 40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — Payment of proceeds -- Requirements ~ Proceeding on petition to
determine cause of nonpayment ~ Remedies - Penalties

(1) (a) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any well producing oil or gas in the state
shall be paid to any person legally entitled to the payment of the proceeds not later than 180 days after the first day of
the month following the date of the first sale and thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month
within which payment is received by the payor for production, unless other periods or arrangements are provided for in
a valid contract with the person entitled to the proceeds.
(b) The payment shall be made directly to the person entitled to the payment by the payor.
(c) The payment is considered to have been made upon deposit in the United States mail.
(2) Payments shall be remitted to any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds annually for the aggregate of up to 12
months accumulation of proceeds, if the total amount owed is $ 100 or less.
(3) (a) Any delay in determining whether a person is legally entitled to an interest in the oil and gas proceeds does
not affect payments to other persons entitled to payment.
(b) (i) If accrued payments cannot be made within the time limits specified in Subsection (1) or (2), the payor
shall deposit all oil and gas proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an escrow account in a
federally insured bank or savings and loan institution using a standard escrow document form.
(ii) The deposit shall earn interest at the highest rate being offered by that institution for the amount and term of
similar demand deposits.
(iii) The escrow agent may commingle money received into escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser,
or other person legally responsible for payment.
(iv) Payment of principal and accrued interest from the escrow account shall be made by the escrow agent to the
person legally entitled to them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal determination
of entitlement to the payment.

Page 2
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9

(v) Applicable escrow fees shall be deducted from the payments.
(4) Any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds may file a petition with the board to conduct a hearing to determine
why the proceeds have not been paid.
(5) Upon receipt of the petition, the board shall set the matter for investigation and negotiation by the division
within 60 days.
(6) (a) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board may set a hearing within 30 days.
(b) If the board does not set a hearing, any information gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be
given to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(7) (a) If, after a hearing, the board finds the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest bearing escrow
account in accordance with Subsection (3), the board may order that:
(i) a complete accounting be made; and
(ii) the proceeds be subject to an interest rate of 1 1/2% per month, as a substitute for an escrow account interest
rate, accruing from the date the payment should have been suspended in accordance with Subsection (3).
(b) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is without reasonable justification, the board may:
(i) if the proceeds have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3):
(A) order a complete accounting;
(B) require the proceeds and accruing interest to remain in the escrow account; and
(C) assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total proceeds and interest in the escrow account; or
(ii) if the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection
(3), assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total proceeds and interest as determined under Subsection (a).
(c) (i) Upon finding that the delay of payment is without reasonable justification, the board shall set a date not
later than 90 days from the hearing for final distribution of the total sum.
(ii) If payment is not made by the required date, the total proceeds, interest, and any penalty as provided in
Subsection (b) shall be subject to interest at a rate of 1 1/2% per month until paid.
(d) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is with reasonable justification and the proceeds have
been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3), the payor may not be required
to make an accounting or payment of appropriately suspended proceeds until the condition which justified suspension
has been satisfied.
(8) The circumstances under which the board may find the suspension of payment of proceeds is made with
reasonable justification, such that the penalty provisions of Subsections (7)(b) and (7)(c)(ii) do not apply, include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(a) the payor:
(i) fails to make the payment in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah attorney objecting to
the lack of good and marketable title of record of the person claiming entitlement to payment; and
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(ii) furnishes a copy of the relevant portions of the opinion to the person for necessary curative action;
(b) the payor receives information which:
(i) in the payor's good faith judgment, brings into question the entitlement of the person claiming the right to the
payment to receive that payment;
(ii) has rendered the title unmarketable; or
(iii) may expose the payor to the risk of liability to third parties if the payment is made;
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor owed to the person making claim to
payment is less than $ 100 at the end of any month; or
(d) the person entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a division or transfer order acknowledging the
proper interest to which the person claims to be entitled and setting forth the mailing address to which payment may be
directed, provided the division or transfer order does not alter or amend the terms of the lease.
(9) If the circumstances described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b) arise, the payor may:
(a) suspend and escrow the payments in accordance with Subsection (3); or
(b) at the request and expense of the person claiming entitlement to the payment, make the payment into court on
an interpleader action to resolve the claim and avoid liability under this chapter.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 40-6-9, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 205, § 1; 1989, ch. 86, § 2; 1992, ch. 34, § 4; 1993, ch. 151, § 1.
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